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Automated facial recognition (AFR) is perhaps the most controversial policing tool of the 
twenty-first century. Police forces in England and Wales, and beyond, are using facial 
recognition in various contexts, from evidence gathering to the identification and monitoring 
of criminal suspects. Despite uncertainty regarding its accuracy, and widespread concerns 
about its impact on human rights and broader social consequences, the rise of police facial 
recognition continues unabated by law. Both the Government and the domestic courts were 
satisfied that police use of this technology is regulated adequately by existing statutory 
provisions regulating the processing of data and police surveillance generally. That is, until 
the recent judgment of the Court of Appeal in R. (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales 
Police and ors [2020] EWCA Civ 1058, where it was held that the respondent’s use of AFR 
was unlawful. This article provides an analysis of AFR, reflecting on the outcome of that case 
and evaluates its nuanced findings. We suggest that the judgment leaves considerable room for 
police AFR to continue with only minor, piecemeal amendment to the legal framework. 
Drawing on comparative experience and relevant socio-legal scholarship, we argue that the 
relatively unfettered rise of police facial recognition in England and Wales illuminates deeper 
flaws in the domestic framework for fundamental human rights protection and adjudication, 
which create the conditions for authoritarian policing and surveillance to expand. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Rapid advances in technology are disrupting the balance of power between governors and the 
governed. Automated facial recognition technology (henceforth, AFR) is not the only biometric 
surveillance technology that is in ascendency and posing challenges for law, but it is perhaps 
the one that has most captured the public imagination. AFR is an algorithmic technology. AFR 
algorithms are developed to locate a face within an image, measure the geometric features of 
the face (distance between eyes, width of mouth etc), and then ‘match’ the face to a previously 
stored image of the individual (usually stored on a watchlist or database), based on the strength 
of the correlation between geometric features.1 It has numerous applications, such as 
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1 J Fong, ‘What facial recognition steals from us’ (Vox, 10 December 2019), available at: 
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automating border identity verification checks,2 pupil registration in schools,3 or enabling more 
effective photo sharing on social networking sites.  
 
AFR is being utilised by law enforcement agencies across the world to fulfil various functions. 
In some jurisdictions with autocratic political regimes, AFR has been used for overt repression 
and persecution. One egregious example is the Communist Party of China, which has invested 
heavily in developing the infrastructure to pervasively monitor and control citizens. In 2015, 
Party officials called for an acceleration of public security video monitoring systems in order 
to achieve ‘systematic and dense coverage’ of all public areas.4 In particular, the Party has 
targeted its Uyghur Muslim population in the Xinjiang region, installing AFR cameras, 
supplied by global surveillance manufacturer Hikvision, at the entrances to 967 mosques.5 
Most security checkpoints stationed along Xinjiang’s major roads now employ facial 
recognition cameras of varying sophistication.6 The technology is facilitating the Communist 
Party of China’s authoritarian control of the region, where internment in ‘re-education camps’ 
and other human rights abuses of the Uyghur population have been well documented.7  
 
Chinese AFR surveillance infrastructure is also being purchased and utilised by Governments 
in developing nations, such as Uganda and Zimbabwe.8 Other autocratic regimes are looking 
to AFR to strengthen controls on their citizens’ movements. In January 2020, Amnesty 
International reported that Russian authorities plan to operationalise a large-scale facial 
recognition system covering the whole Moscow Metro transportation network.9 Whilst the use 
of AFR in these jurisdictions is not constrained by the checks and balances of jurisdictions with 
stronger legal human rights protections, the fast-paced expansion of experimental AFR in 
jurisdictions with broad commitments to liberal democracy, without prior parliamentary 
approval, raises legitimate questions concerning the effectiveness of the operation of any such 
checks and balances. Particularly, as to whether these checks and balances are robust enough 
to harness law enforcement to operate within the constraints of human rights law before 
experimental forms of surveillance technology are deployed.  
                                                             
2 Such as in the European Union’s proposed automated Entry/Exit System. See Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017.  
3 M Andrejevic and N Selwyn, ‘Facial recognition technology in schools: critical questions and concerns’ 
(2020) 45 Learning, Media and Technology 115. 
4 Z Zhengfu ‘Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting, guoquyuan bangongting yinfa “guanyu jiaqiang shehui zhi’an 
fangkong tixi jianshe de yijian”’ [The CCP CC General Office and State Council General Office issue ‘Opinion 
on building a system to strengthening public order and control’] (Xinhua, April 13 2015), available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-04/13/content_2846013.htm. Quoted in J Leibold ‘Surveillance in China’s 
Xinjiang region: ethnic sorting, coercion, and inducement’ (2019) 29 Journal of Contemporary China 46. 
5 E Feng ‘China steps up surveillance on Xinjiang Muslims’ (Financial Times, 18 July 2018), available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/c610c88a-8a57-11e8-bf9e-8771d5404543. 
6 Ibid. 
7 P Mozur ‘One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a Minority’, (New York Times, 
14 April 2019), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial-
intelligence-racial-profiling.html        
8 A Gross et al ‘Chinese tech groups shaping UN facial recognition standards’ (Financial Times, 2 December 
2019), available at: https://www.ft.com/content/c3555a3c-0d3e-11ea-b2d6-9bf4d1957a67. 
9Amnesty International UK ‘Russia: Legal challenge to 'intrusive' facial recognition technology’ (Media 




In the United States,10 Australia,11 and several EU Member States,12 AFR has been used by 
police forces to monitor public spaces, and to retrospectively identify suspects by running 
CCTV images collected from a crime scene against police databases. Furthermore, the COVID-
19 pandemic has prompted the use of facial recognition software to ascertain if someone is 
wearing a mask, the amendment of algorithms to be able to identify someone who is wearing 
a mask, and also AFR’s combination with thermal imaging to determine if someone has a 
temperature, which is a common symptom of COVID-19. Such uses are evident in public 
spaces, workplaces and vulnerable/hotspot locations like aged-care facilities.13   
In England and Wales, police forces have used the technology for retrospective identification,14 
and to identify suspects in their custody.15 AFR has also been used by police at a number of 
public gatherings to identify ‘persons of interest’ in real time. Owing to concerns over its 
impact on human rights, the police use of AFR has sparked public protests16 and counter-
surveillance reactions, including the use of face coverings,17 and the tactical use of lasers to 
obstruct AFR apparatus.18 Civil liberties group, Liberty, has campaigned to ban the police use 
of AFR altogether, particularly in public spaces.19 So far, these calls have been resisted by 
English lawmakers but, as we shall discuss, the regulation of police AFR has been, and 
continues to be, an evolutionary process. In September 2019, the High Court of Justice in R 
(Bridges) v The Chief Constable of South Wales, held that the law permits police the discretion 
to use AFR for various operational functions.20 The Divisional Court found in the respondent’s 
                                                             
10 S Ghaffary ‘How to avoid a dystopian future of facial recognition in law enforcement’ (Vox, 10 December 
2019), available at: https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/10/20996085/ai-facial-recognition-police-law-
enforcement-regulation.  
11 A Bogle ‘Australian Federal Police officers trialled controversial facial recognition tool Clearview AI’ (ABC 
News, 14 April 2020), available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2020-04-14/clearview-ai-facial-
recognition-tech-australian-federal-police/12146894. 
12 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Facial Recognition Technology: Fundamental Rights 
Considerations in the Context of Law Enforcement (27 November 2019); L Kayali, ‘How facial recognition is 
taking over a French city’ (Politico, 26 September 2019), available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/how-
facial-recognition-is-taking-over-a-french-riviera-city/. 
13 C Burt ‘Facial recognition temperature scanning, wearables and voice biometrics deployed for COVID-19 
spread prevention’ (Biometric Update, 3 August 2020), available at: 
https://www.biometricupdate.com/202008/facial-recognition-temperature-scanning-wearables-and-voice-
biometrics-deployed-for-covid-19-spread-prevention.  
14 Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation Snapshot Paper-Facial Recognition Technology (28 May 2020) para 
[5.2], available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cdei-publishes-briefing-paper-on-facial-
recognition-technology/snapshot-paper-facial-recognition-technology. 
15 Universities’ Police Science Institute and Crime & Security Research Institute An Evaluation of South Wales 
Police’s Use of Automated Facial Recognition (Cardiff, 2018) p 30, available at: https://afr.south-
wales.police.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/AFR-EVALUATION-REPORT-FINAL-SEPTEMBER-2018.pdf.  
16 ‘Fans stage protest against use of facial recognition technology ahead of Cardiff v Swansea match’ (ITV 
News, 12 January 2020), available at: https://www.itv.com/news/wales/2020-01-12/fans-stage-protest-against-
use-of-facial-recognition-technology-ahead-of-cardiff-v-swansea-match/. 
17 A Hearn ‘Anti-surveillance clothing aims to hide wearers from facial recognition’ (The Guardian, 4 January 
2017), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/04/anti-surveillance-clothing-facial-
recognition-hyperface. 
18 A Cuthbertson ‘Hong Kong protesters use lasers to avoid facial recognition cameras and blind police’ (The 
Independent, 1 August 2019), available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-
lasers-facial-recognition-ai-china-police-a9033046.html. 
19 I Sample ‘Facial recognition tech is arsenic in the water of democracy, says Liberty’ (The Guardian, 8 June 
2019), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/07/facial-recognition-technology-liberty-
says-england-wales-police-use-should-be-banned. 
20 R (Bridges) v The Chief Constable of South Wales [2019] EWHC 2341 (Admin). 
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favour despite ‘the lack of a clear legislative framework for the technology’.21 Indeed, the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 provides a legal framework for two types of biometrics, DNA 
and fingerprints, but does not apply to other biometrics such as facial images, gait, or voice. In 
August 2020, the Court of Appeal allowed the claimant’s appeal on the grounds that the South 
Wales Police’s (SWP) use of AFR was unlawful as it was not ‘in accordance with law’ for the 
purposes of Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the SWP 
had failed to carry out a proper Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA). The SWP also 
failed to comply with the public sector equality duty (PSED).  This was reportedly the first 
successful legal challenge to AFR technology use in the world.  
 
This article subjects the decisions in Bridges and, more broadly, the Government’s position on 
the legality of police AFR use, to critical scrutiny. It will argue that the legal basis for police 
AFR surveillance is inadequate, and that the legal framework regulating the police use of this 
technology is too imprecise to protect citizens from abuse or arbitrariness. Drawing on the 
experience of other common law jurisdictions, and relevant socio-legal scholarship, the article 
suggests that this framework and its interpretation in domestic courts transforms human rights 
protection into a tick-box exercise, foreclosing important political debate on the normative 
consequences of police AFR surveillance. English and Welsh police forces have been afforded 
too much discretion to ‘widen the net’ of biometric surveillance, without explicit democratic 
approval.    
2. AFR IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
Since at least 2014, several police forces in England and Wales have trialled the use of AFR in 
several contexts. AFR is used in three broad ways:   
 
1. Identity verification 
A suspect is arrested but refuses to provide their name to police. Here, police could take a 
static ‘probe image’ of the individual’s face. AFR software could then be used to verify the 
individual’s identity by comparing the probe image against a database of images that the 
police control, or to which the police have access.  
 
2. Retrospective or speculative identification  
CCTV footage shows a suspected burglar leaving a property. A still of the suspect’s face is 
used as a probe image and compared with a database of custody images (commonly known 
as ‘mugshots’). The AFR software generates a shortlist list of possible matches, and police 
arrest a suspect based on their place of residence being close to the crime scene and the 
strength of the AFR ‘match’.  
 
3.  Live AFR  
A live deployment of AFR may be used to identify ‘persons of interest’ to the authorities as 
they traverse a vicinity of public space. Live AFR typically involves the deployment of 
surveillance cameras to capture digital images of members of the public, which are then 
compared with digital images of persons on a pre-assembled ‘watchlist’ of images the police 
have compiled for the purpose of the deployment. 
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The decision to use or not use AFR in a particular context is value-laden. Tensions between 
competing values and aims arise at different points in the development, deployment and 
maintenance of AFR, as with any other algorithmic system.22 For example, the use of AFR for 
identity verification will be more accurate and safe than for a live AFR system, as it will involve 
the comparison of one clear and static image with another, also likely of high quality (a one: 
one comparison). Live AFR is likely to involve a ‘one to many’ comparison, that is, a target 
image with a database of subjects, or ‘many to many’ search, dataset to dataset. The live system 
may also bring into play human rights considerations that do not apply when utilising the first 
type (eg it may have a disruptive ‘chilling’ effect on public assemblies if used to monitor 
crowds at a protest or sporting event23). Likewise, speculative identification through AFR may 
raise issues pertaining to criminal procedure and fair trial rights that do not arise with other 
types of AFR, when these are used in a non-investigative capacity.24  
In England and Wales, several police forces have experimented with the use of AFR in 
numerous contexts. The most prominent trials have been conducted by Leicestershire Police, 
SWP, and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).25 The MPS has since gone beyond trialling 
the technology, adding AFR to their operational public surveillance arsenal.26 
Domestic forces have also collaborated with private organisations to engage in AFR 
surveillance activities. In August 2019, it was reported that several commercial landowners 
were using AFR surveillance on their publicly accessible land.27 In September of the same year, 
the Metropolitan Police acknowledged that it had supplied images of individuals for one 
commercial landowner to use when deploying AFR at its site in the Kings Cross area of 
London.28 In January 2020, the New York Times reported that a small AFR start-up company, 
Clearview AI, had sold its AFR tool to over 600 law enforcement agencies around the world, 
and a number of police forces based in the UK had accessed the Clearview AI database. The 
tool, which ‘scrapes’ and compares photos without consent from online platforms, is described 
as follows: 
                                                             
22 N Lynch, L Campbell, J Purshouse and M Betkier Facial Recognition Technology in New Zealand: Towards a 
Legal and Ethical Framework (November 2020); The Law Society Commission on the Use of Algorithms in the 
Justice System and The Law Society of England and Wales Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System (June 2019) 
p 4.  
23 J Purshouse and L Campbell ‘Privacy, crime control and police use of automated facial recognition 
technology’ [2019] Criminal Law Review 188.   
24 C Garvie The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America in 2016. 
25 For further detail see above n 23. 
26 A Satariano, ‘London police are taking surveillance to a whole new level’ (New York Times, 24 January 
2020), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/business/london-police-facial-
recognition.html?auth=login-email&login=email. 
27 In London, the use of AFR surveillance by property developer, Argent, on its publicly accessible land in the 
Kings Cross area of the city prompted public disquiet and an investigation by the Information Commissioner’s 
Office. See M Murgia ‘London’s King’s Cross uses facial recognition in security cameras’ (Financial Times, 12 
August 2019), available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8cbcb3ae-babd-11e9-8a88-aa6628ac896c. See also: AR 
Cuthbert and KG McKinnell ‘Ambiguous space, ambiguous rights – corporate power and social control in Hong 
Kong’ (1997) 14 Cities 295; D Sabbagh ‘Regulator looking at use of facial recognition at King's Cross site’ (The 
Guardian, 12 August 2019), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/12/regulator-
looking-at-use-of-facial-recognition-at-kings-cross-site?CMP=share_btn_link.  
28 L Kelion ‘Met police gave images for King’s Cross facial recognition scans’ (BBC, 6 September 2019), 
available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-49586582. 
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 You take a picture of a person, upload it and get to see public photos of that person, along 
with links to where those photos appeared. The system — whose backbone is a database of 
more than three billion images that Clearview claims to have scraped from Facebook, 
YouTube, Venmo and millions of other websites — goes far beyond anything ever 
constructed by the United States government or Silicon Valley giants.29  
Many of Clearview AI’s clients, including several UK and Australian police forces, had not 
previously disclosed or indeed had denied their use of the app to the public, and had no internal 
guidance or policies regulating the circumstances in which they might use the app.30 The 
Information Commissioner’s Office and its Australian counterpart have opened a joint 
investigation into Clearview AI’s personal information handling practices.31 
The rise of AFR has not been frictionless. Civil liberties organisations, such as Liberty, various 
academics (including the authors of this paper) as well as the Home Office Biometrics and 
Forensics Ethics Group, have raised concerns that the police use of AFR lacks a firm legal 
basis, and poses an acute threat to various human rights, including the rights to privacy, free 
association, and freedom from discrimination.32 In July 2019, the House of Commons Science 
and Technology Select Committee called on the Government to issue a moratorium on live 
AFR ‘until a legislative framework has been introduced and guidance on trial protocols, and 
an oversight and evaluation system, has been established.’33 Their concerns were, it seems, 
well founded. In the same month, an independent report of the Metropolitan Police Service’s 
trial of live AFR documented identified several issues arising from the governance of the trials, 
pertaining to the very low number of arrests made in comparison to numbers scanned by the 
system; its operational use by the Met; and the legal basis relied on for the trials.34 Perhaps 
owing to concern that this independent evaluation did not produce the desired results, the 
Metropolitan Police produced their own evaluation report, which took a more positive view of 
the trials and concluded that AFR will ‘stop dangerous people and make London safer’.35 The 
document made no reference to the independent evaluation study, and did little to address its 
main findings. 
                                                             
29 K Hill, ‘The secretive company that might end privacy as we know it’ (New York Times, 18 January 2020), 
available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html. 
30 R Mac et al ‘Clearview’s facial recognition app has been used by the Justice Department, ICE, Macy’s, 
Walmart, and the NBA’ (Buzzfeed News, 27 February 2020), available at:  
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law-enforcement; A Bogle 
‘Documents reveal AFP’s use of controversial facial recognition technology Clearview Ai’ (ABC News, 13 July 
2020), available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-13/afp-use-of-facial-recocognition-sofware-
clearview-ai-revealed/12451554; Australian Federal Police Clearview – Section 44 of the Privacy Act 1988 – 
Notice to give information and/or produce documents to the Information Commissioner (2020), available at: 
https://www.afp.gov.au/sites/default/files/PDF/Disclosure-Log/02-2020.pdf.  
31 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner ‘OAIC and UK’s ICO open joint investigation into 
Clearview AI Inc.’ (Media Release, 9 July 2020), available at https://www.oaic.gov.au/updates/news-and-
media/oaic-and-uks-ico-open-joint-investigation-into-clearview-ai-inc/.  
32 Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group Ethical Issues Arising From the Police Use of Live Facial 
Recognition Technology (February 2019).  
33 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee The Work of the Biometrics Commissioner and the 
Forensic Science Regulator, Nineteenth Report of Session 2017–19, HC 1970, 18 July 2019 (HMSO, 2019) at 
para 37. 
34 The Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project Independent Report on the London Metropolitan Police 
Service’s Trial of Live Facial Recognition Technology (July 2019). 
35 Metropolitan Police Service and National Physical Laboratory Metropolitan Police Service Live Facial 
Recognition Trials (2020) p 3. 
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The Information Commissioner, Biometrics Commissioner and the Surveillance Camera 
Commissioner have all expressed concerns about the rapid rise of AFR in a policing context, 
too.36 In February 2020, almost six months after the Divisional Court judgment in Bridges had 
been handed down, Lord Clement Jones sponsored a Private Members Bill, which would 
prohibit the use of AFR technology in public places and to provide for a review of its use.37 At 
the time of writing, no date has been announced for the Bill’s second reading.  
Despite this widespread criticism and political resistance, the rise of AFR in policing continued 
apace. The South Wales Police continued to trial AFR for both live surveillance and identity 
verification. The Metropolitan Police have used live AFR at numerous shopping centres and 
public places in 2020, and several other forces are reported to have used AFR surveillance, 
without publicising their trials.38 Parliament has not introduced any specific laws relating to 
AFR. The police have maintained that the legal basis regulating its proper operational limits 
lay in the DPA 2018; the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice; and relevant common law and 
human rights principles. As indicated above, these arguments were put to the test in the Bridges 
case, when a Divisional Court considered an application for judicial review of the legality of 
South Wales Police’s use of AFR.39 
 
3. R (BRIDGES) V CHIEF CONSTABLE OF SOUTH WALES POLICE  
South Wales Police is the national lead on AFR, having received a £2.6 million government 
grant to test the technology.40 A Cardiff resident, Mr Bridges (described as a civil liberties 
campaigner) had challenged the legality of SWP’s general use and two particular deployments 
of AFR on the grounds that this was contrary to the Human Rights Act 1998, Data Protection 
legislation, and that the decision to implement it had not been taken in accordance with the 
Equality Act 2010. The Divisional Court rejected this application.  
It is worth highlighting some of the dimensions of the SWP initiative to illuminate the reasons 
behind the Divisional Court’s refusal of judicial review, and the later overturning of this 
decision on appeal. In April 2017, SWP began a trial of automatic AFR with subsequent 
national rollout in mind. The trial comprised two pilots, one of which was known as AFR 
Locate and the other known as AFR Identify. The judicial review proceedings concerned AFR 
Locate; a form of live AFR. This involves the processing of digital images of members of the 
public taken from live CCTV feeds, and the comparison of these images with biometric 
information of individuals on a watchlist compiled specifically for the purpose of the 
deployment of AFR. The SWP took steps to inform members of the public that AFR Locate 
                                                             
36 see ICO investigation into how the police use facial recognition technology in public places 
31 October 2019, https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2616185/live-frt-law-enforcement-report-
20191031.pdf ; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/automated-facial-recognition; 
https://videosurveillance.blog.gov.uk/2019/11/01/regulating-law-enforcement-use-of-automatic-facial-
recognition/  
37 Automated Facial Recognition Technology (Moratorium and Review) Bill 2019–2021. 
38 O Williams ‘The Met and NCA “used Clearview AI’s facial recognition database”’ (New Statesman, 28 
February 2020), available at: https://tech.newstatesman.com/security/the-met-and-nca-used-clearview-ais-facial-
recognition-database. 
39 Bridges (Divisional Court), above n 23. 
40 ‘Police transformation fund: successful bids 2016 to 2017’ (Web Page), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-transformation-fund-successful-bids-2016-to-2017.  
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was being used at a particular event or area by posting on social media and putting signs up in 
the vicinity of the trial. 
In terms of human rights, the Divisional Court concluded that while the use of AFR Locate 
engaged the ECHR Article 8 (privacy) rights of the members of the public whose images were 
taken and processed, there was no violation of Article 8 as the SWP’s use of AFR was ‘in 
accordance with the law’ and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’, and in pursuit of the 
legitimate aim of preventing or detecting crime, for the purposes of Article 8(2). On the legality 
point, AFR use was deemed to be within the police’s common law powers so that there is 
currently no need to legislate to permit its use and it was not ultra vires, at least as practised in 
the SWP trials. Moreover, those actions were subject to adequate legal controls, contained in 
Data Protection legislation, statutory codes of practice, and SWP’s policies. The pilots were 
legally justified; AFR Locate was deployed only for a limited time, and for specific and limited 
purposes. Furthermore, unless someone’s image matched that on the watchlist, all data were 
deleted immediately after having been processed. The CCTV feed is retained for 31 days in 
accordance with the standard CCTV retention period, and data associated with a match is 
retained within AFR Locate for up to 24 hours. In its necessity analysis, the Divisional Court 
found that the benefits of live AFR were potentially great, as serious offenders might be 
apprehended, and the impact on Mr Bridges was relatively minor as he was not stopped by the 
police, and so the use of AFR was proportionate under Article 8(2). 
As for the data protection claims, the Court determined that the collection and processing by 
SWP of images of members of the public constituted collecting and processing of their personal 
data, notwithstanding that they might not be identifiable by name. Such processing of personal 
data was deemed to be lawful and to comply with the conditions in the DPA 2018. The Court 
was also satisfied that SWP had complied with the requirements of the public sector equality 
duty.  
Mr Bridges sought leave to appeal the Divisional Court’s decision on the following five 
grounds:  
1. The Divisional Court erred in concluding that the interference with the Appellant’s Article 
8 rights occasioned by SWP’s use of AFR was ‘in accordance with the law’ for the purposes 
of Article 8(2) ECHR.  
2. The Court made an error of law in assessing whether SWP’s use of AFR constituted a 
proportionate interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights.  
3. The Divisional Court erred in holding that SWP’s Data Protection Impact Assessment 
complied with the DPA 2018, s 64. 
4. the Divisional Court erred in declining to reach a conclusion on whether SWP has in place 
an appropriate policy document within the meaning of the DPA 2018, s 42 (taken with s 
35(5)), which is a condition precedent for lawful data processing.  
5. the Divisional Court made an error of law in concluding that SWP has complied with the 
Public Sector Equality Duty the Equality Act 2010, s 149, given that its approach to the 
equalities implications of AFR is ‘demonstrably flawed’ as it failed to recognise the risk of 
indirect discrimination.41 
 
                                                             
41 R (Bridges) v SWP (2020) EWCA Civ 1058 at [53].  
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On the first ground, the Court of Appeal ruled that the Divisional Court did err in its finding 
that the measures were ‘in accordance with the law’. The Court of Appeal did not revisit the 
issue of whether or not the use of AFR was ultra vires the SWP, holding that the police had 
long used overt surveillance techniques such as overt photography that were ‘undoubtedly’ in 
accordance with the law.42 Instead, the Court engaged in a holistic analysis of whether the 
framework governing the SWP’s use of live AFR was reasonably accessible and predictable in 
its application,43 and sufficiently prescribed to guard against ‘overbroad discretion resulting in 
arbitrary, and thus disproportionate, interference with Convention rights’.44  
The Court of Appeal rejected the contention that for the police to use AFR they needed some 
statutory authorisation, but accepted, applying a relativist approach, that more would be 
required by way of safeguards for AFR than for overt photography as the former was a novel 
technology that involved the automated processing of sensitive data.45 However, unlike the 
Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal was not satisfied that the SWP’s use of live AFR was 
sufficiently regulated by the combination of the DPA 2018, the Surveillance Camera Code of 
Practice and SWP’s local policies. In particular, the legal framework left too much discretion 
in the hands of individual officers to determine who was to be placed on the watchlist, and 
where AFR could be deployed.46 Thus, the framework did not sufficiently set out the terms on 
which discretionary powers in these areas could be exercised and for that reason they did not 
have the necessary quality of law. The Court held that a police force’s local policies could 
constitute relevant law in this context, provided they were published and would not leave too 
much discretion to individual officers. This finding is significant. In short, if SWP were to 
amend their own policies in such a way that the criteria for (i) who could be put on a watchlist, 
and (ii) where AFR could be used, were more narrowly circumscribed, this could be all that is 
needed to satisfy the ‘in accordance with the law’ limb of article 8(2).  
The appeal did not succeed on the second ground. Here, the Court held that the SWP’s use of 
AFR was a proportionate interference with Article 8 rights, and as such was ‘necessary’ and 
‘in pursuit of a legitimate aim’ under Article 8(2). The appellant submitted that the Divisional 
Court fell into error as a matter of approach when addressing the question of proportionality, 
because it conducted a weighing exercise with one side being the actual and anticipated benefits 
of AFR Locate and the other side being the impact of AFR deployment on the appellant. The 
appellant argued that ‘as a matter of common sense’, account needs to be taken of the 
interference with the Article 8 rights not only of the particular appellant but all other members 
of the public in the vicinity of SWP’s AFR deployments.47 The Court of Appeal rejected this 
argument as the focus of the appeal was the impact upon the appellant alone, and, in any event, 
the impact on the Article 8 rights of other members of the public was as negligible as it was on 
the appellant. In the Court’s words, ‘An impact that has very little weight cannot become 
weightier simply because other people were also affected. It is not a question of simple 
multiplication.’48 
                                                             
42 Ibid at [84]. 
43 Here, R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers [2015] UKSC 9 at [11]–[14] per Lord Sumption was 
cited with approval.   
44 Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions [2016] AC 88 at [31] and [32] per Lord Hughes. 
45 Bridges, above n 44, at [85]–[90]. 
46 Ibid, at [96]. 
47 Ibid, at [136]. 
48 Ibid, at [143]. 
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On ground three, the Divisional Court erred in finding that SWP provided an adequate ‘data 
protection impact assessment’ (DPIA) as required by DPA 2018, s 64. The ‘inevitable 
consequence’ of the data protection impact assessment being written on the basis that Article 
8 is not infringed is that it failed to adequately assess the risks to the rights and freedoms of 
data subjects or include the measures envisaged to address the risks arising from those 
deficiencies as required by Data Protection Act 2018, s 64(3)(b) and (c). However, on the fourth 
ground the Court of Appeal held that it was ‘entirely appropriate’ for the Divisional Court not 
to reach a conclusion as to whether SWP had in place an ‘appropriate policy document’ within 
the meaning of DPA 2018, s 42, as the deployments at issue took place before the DPA 2018 
was enacted.49  
Finally, the appeal succeeded on the fifth ground. The Court of Appeal held that the SWP never 
had due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex and race. The Court 
of Appeal found that, whether or not the facial recognition software used by SWP is biased and 
creates a greater risk of false identifications among certain demographic groups, the police 
breached their positive duty to have due regard to the need to eliminate such discrimination; 
the ‘SWP have never sought to satisfy themselves, either directly or by way of independent 
verification, that the software program in this case does not have an unacceptable bias on 
grounds of race or sex.’50  
This issue of bias is contentious. It is clear that AFR varies in terms of accuracy and reliability 
in matching individuals to images, depending on gender, age, skin colour, etc, and such 
embedded bases may compound existing biases in policing. The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), a subgroup of the US Federal Department of Commerce, has provided 
technical evaluation of over 100 commercially available facial recognition algorithms as part 
of its ‘Facial Recognition Vendor Tests’ (FRVT). They measure the accuracy of facial 
recognition software algorithms in ‘one-to-one’ (image verification) and ‘one-to-many’ 
(database search) contexts. The performance of face recognition systems can vary relative to 
the gender, ethnicity and age of the individuals targeted.51 NIST’s FRVT Part 3 focused 
specifically on demographic effects on the performance of 189 commercially available facial 
recognition algorithms. It found that many of the algorithms varied in performance across 
different demographic groups, and that the part of the world in which the algorithm was 
developed could have a significant impact on its performance.52 For example, algorithms 
developed in the United States tend to have the high false positive rates for West and East 
African and East Asian people in one-to-one matching, whereas for a number of algorithms 
developed in China this effect is reversed, with low false positive rates on East Asian faces.53  
For ‘one-to-many’ matching, the test found that African American females were subject to high 
rates of false positives. This is significant because a false positive match on a ‘one-to-many’ 
                                                             
49 Ibid, at [161]. 
50 Ibid, at [199]. 
51 See above note 23. J Buolamwini and T Gebru, ‘Gender shades: intersectional accuracy disparities in 
commercial gender classification’ (Conference Paper, Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and 
Transparency, 2018) 2; J Buolamwini, ‘Response: racial and gender bias in Amazon Rekognition — 
commercial AI system for analyzing faces’ Medium (25 January 2019), available at: 
https://medium.com/@Joy.Buolamwini/response-racial-and-gender-bias-in-amazon-rekognition-commercial-ai-
system-for-analyzing-faces-a289222eeced. 
52 National Institute of Standards and Technology Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Part 3: Demographic 
Effects (No 8280, 2019). 
53 Ibid, 2. 
 11 
search could put an individual at risk of being subject to scrutiny by authorities as a result of 
an incorrect match against a database. The Court of Appeal’s finding on this fifth ground is 
significant and welcome; it will have implications stretching to the use by public authorities of 
algorithmic technologies generally. The Court of Appeal has made clear that public authorities 
have a positive duty to take measures, such as independent verification, to ensure that the 
technologies they use for processing sensitive personal data do not produce unacceptable 
demographic bias. 
Bridges was the first ever legal challenge to the use of AFR. The Court of Appeal has 
underlined that the police do not enjoy boundless discretion to deploy biometric surveillance 
on the general public as they traverse publicly accessible space. In the aftermath of the Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Bridges, the response of both the Metropolitan Police and the South 
Wales Police seems to suggest that judgment will not serve as the end of a legal saga on the 
limits of police AFR surveillance. South Wales Police has indicated that it will not appeal the 
Court of Appeal’s decision and in published comments following the judgement, stated:  
There is nothing in the Court of Appeal judgment that fundamentally undermines the use of 
facial recognition to protect the public. This judgement will only strengthen the work which 
is already underway to ensure that the operational policies we have in place can withstand 
robust legal challenge and public scrutiny.54 
In its own reaction, the MPS gave clear indication that the judgment would not present 
significant obstacles to its own use of live AFR, emphasising that its own live AFR operations 
could be distinguished from the SWP’s trials; the main differences being that the MPS’s use of 
this technology ‘… is intelligence-led, and focused on helping tackle serious crime, including 
serious violence, gun and knife crime, child sexual exploitation and helping protect the 
vulnerable.’ As well as being more targeted in its use, the MPS also claimed that its AFR 
operations are supported by its own bespoke guiding policy documents and ‘the latest accurate 
algorithm’.55 
The police commitment to use AFR has seemingly held firm. The police are considering how, 
and not whether, their AFR operations and policies can be brought into alignment with the 
requirements of law post-Bridges. This should not be too surprising, given that both SWP and 
the MPS have invested considerable resources in their AFR infrastructure to date. 
Although the outcome of Bridges may appear at first glance to deal a heavy blow to the police’s 
ambitions to continue to develop and deploy AFR, owing to the way the case was decided, the 
police may be able to make their AFR operations legally compliant through minor procedural 
amendments. For example, the Court of Appeal left open the possibility that an internal police 
policy document could be brought into accordance with the law for Article 8 purposes if it 
limited the discretion of individual officers as to who can go on a watchlist and where AFR 
can be used. The SWP could clear this low hurdle by making tweaks to its own internal policies, 
despite the absence of a positive legal basis for the police use of AFR beyond general common 
law powers. The Court of Appeal also found that the use of AFR by SWP was proportionate in 
                                                             
54 South Wales Police ‘Response to the Court of Appeal judgment on the use of facial recognition technology’ 
(Media Release, 11 August 2020), available at: https://www.south-wales.police.uk/en/newsroom/response-to-
the-court-of-appeal-judgment-on-the-use-of-facial-recognition-technology/ 
55 Metropolitan Police ‘Live Facial Recognition’ (Web Page), available at: 
https://www.met.police.uk/advice/advice-and-information/facial-recognition/live-facial-recognition/.  
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the face of reasoned doubts about its operational utility and lingering concerns about the human 
rights implications of scanning hundreds of thousands of people to yield comparatively few 
arrests.56  
In what follows, we assess the state of the regulation of police AFR surveillance under English 
law, following the Bridges judgment. Building on our prior work regarding the threats posed 
to human rights by AFR surveillance, and English law’s response to the use by police of this 
technology,57 and drawing on the experience of other jurisdictions and relevant policing 
jurisprudence and literature, we examine the ‘key moments’ in the Bridges judgments, where 
the legal conditions necessary for the continuing expansion of experimental police surveillance 
have been embedded in the English legal framework by the senior courts. Through this 
analysis, we suggest that this framework of broad, overarching safeguards still opens up vast 
operational discretion for the police to set the limits of ‘lawful’ use of an intrusive surveillance 
technology; the human rights and data protection framework functioning less as a barrier to 
government power, and more as a tool of post hoc legitimation, and an instrument of its 
expansion without prior democratic approval.58 Thus, although the regulatory framework for 
police AFR surveillance is based on a discourse of respecting human rights, this discourse 
serves to provide cover for the expansion of pervasive surveillance in practice.59  
 
4. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR POLICE AFR SURVEILLANCE 
Unlike in several continental European jurisdictions, there is no exhaustive code of criminal 
procedure providing explicit textual basis for the exercise of potentially coercive police 
powers.60 Instead, the legal basis for the exercise of police power in England and Wales is 
multifaceted; it consists of statute, delegated legislation, and common law with each piece of 
this moveable mosaic shifting into its proper place depending on the power under exercise. For 
example, to compile a watchlist of images of offenders, the police will typically be able to rely 
on explicit statutory powers to collect and use of custody images, such as those contained in s 
64A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Other statutes, such as the Data Protection 
Act 2018 and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 regulate aspects of AFR use by public and 
private authorities, providing for public notification requirements and retention limits, for 
example. However, under English law there is no explicit textual provision for the police use 
of AFR. Without explicit authorisation for the use of AFR from the legislature in the form of 
an authorising statutory provision, the police must find some other explicit or implicit power 
or liberty supporting their use of this technology.  
                                                             
56 According to the MPS’s own data, approximately 180,000 people were scanned across its 10 trials of AFR, 
leading to 27 people being engaged following an alert and just 9 arrests or other actions being taken based on an 
AFR match; Metropolitan Police Service and National Physical Laboratory Metropolitan Police Service Live 
Facial Recognition Trials (2020) p 3. 
57 See Lynch et al, above n 22; above n 23. 
58 R Lippert and K Walby, ‘Governing through privacy: authoritarian liberalism, law, and privacy knowledge’ 
(2016) 12 Law, Culture and the Humanities 329 at 331. 
59 For a broader discussion of how human rights law and discourse can accommodate authoritarian government 
practices see C Hamilton and R Lippert, ‘Governing through human rights in counter-terrorism: proofing, 
problematization and securitization’ (2020) 28 Critical Criminology 127. 
60 P Roberts, ‘Law and criminal investigation’ in T Newburn, T Williamson, and A Wright (eds) Handbook of 
Criminal Investigation (Oxon: Willan, 2007) p 97.  
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For many of their day-to-day activities, the constable can rely on the same residual liberties 
that all citizens enjoy to do anything that is not expressly forbidden by law.61 This residual 
liberty has its roots in the historical evolution of the police constable as a ‘citizen in uniform’ 
patrolling the streets for the benefit, and with the consent, of his fellow citizens.62 In Malone v 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner, this residual liberty was held to extend very far indeed, 
covering the activities of the Post Office when they, acting on the request of the Metropolitan 
Police, tapped the telephone line of the plaintiff. Despite the absence of any statutory basis for 
the tapping of the telephone line by the authorities at the time, Sir Robert Megarry VC held 
that the tapping was not unlawful, as there was no positive legal right to immunity from this 
activity, observing:  
England, it may be said, is not a country where everything is forbidden except what is 
expressly permitted: it is a country where everything is permitted except what is expressly 
forbidden.63 
The ‘citizen in uniform’ conception of the constable and the extent of the residual liberty he or 
she enjoys are both contestable,64 but it is clear that this residual liberty no longer extends to 
cover intrusive and covert surveillance activities such as wiretaps and other communication 
interceptions. In Malone v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
held that the UK Government’s reliance on this residual liberty did not satisfy the ‘in 
accordance with the law’ limb of Article 8(2).65 By the time the judgment was delivered, the 
Government had already placed the regulation of public authority wiretapping on a statutory 
footing in the Interception of Communications Act 1985.  
The idea that the police could depend on this residual liberty to engage in overt surveillance, 
such as recording and monitoring individuals in public spaces, has persisted. In Murray v 
United Kingdom, the first applicant was detained by the British Army in Belfast during the 
Northern Ireland conflict and taken to a screening centre. She argued, inter alia, that her Article 
8 rights had been violated as she was photographed by the British Army, without her 
knowledge and consent, and the photographs were kept on record along with personal details 
about her, her family and her home. The domestic courts had dismissed her claim that the taking 
and retention of her photograph in these circumstances was in any way actionable, with the 
Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland finding:  
The act of taking the photograph involved nothing in the nature of a physical assault. 
Whether such an act would constitute an invasion of privacy so as to be actionable in the 
United States is irrelevant, because the [first applicant] can only recover damages if it 
                                                             
61 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344 at p 357; Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 
at p 1178. 
62 See Home Office, Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure (Command Paper 3297 1929) 6. As 
Roberts describes: ‘Just as you or I can stop a stranger in the street to request directions, to ask the time, to solicit 
a donation to charity or for any other lawful purpose, the police are similarly entitled to stop a stranger in the street 
and ask him or her what he or she is doing, whether he or she has seen anything suspicious, where he or she lives,’ 
P Roberts, ‘Law and Criminal Investigation’ in T Newburn, T Williamson, and A Wright (eds) Handbook of 
Criminal Investigation (Oxon: Willan, 2007) p 97. 
63 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344 at p 357. 
64 See generally R v Somerset County Council, ex p Fewings [1995] 1 All ER 513. For a fuller discussion of the 
historical roots of this conception of the constable and the residual liberty of police officers to do everything 
‘except what is expressly forbidden’, see V Aston, ‘Conceptualising surveillance harms in the context of political 
protest: privacy, autonomy and freedom of assembly’ (PhD Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2019). 
65 See Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14 at [79]. 
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amounts to a tort falling within one of the recognised branches of the law on the topic. 
According to the common law there is no remedy if someone takes a photograph of another 
against his will.66 
Thus, the actions of the British Army were said to be lawful because they were not legally 
forbidden. The ECtHR rejected the applicant’s contention that the measures lacked a legal basis 
such as is required for the measures to be ‘in accordance with the law’ under Article 8(2). The 
Strasbourg Court ruled that the common law provided sufficient domestic legal basis.67  
Then in R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, the Court of Appeal considered 
the legal basis for overt police photography surveillance.68 The claimant - a political 
campaigner - was photographed by the police at a protest outside the Annual General Meeting 
of a company connected to the arms trade. A majority of the Court held that the police had 
violated the claimant’s Article 8 rights because the collection and retention of the images was 
disproportionate in the circumstances. The Court did not reach a decisive view on whether the 
common law provided adequate legal basis for the activities of the police to be ‘in accordance 
with the law’. Although obiter, Laws LJ observed, ‘the requirement of legality is in my 
judgment satisfied by the general common law power referred to in Murray’.69  
This line of authority seems to indicate that the police do not require a positive legal power to 
engage in overt surveillance operations. However, in its more recent case law the ECtHR has 
been more exacting in its analysis of the quality of the legal basis underpinning surveillance 
measures, including the use of photography.70 It is noteworthy in this regard that Murray v 
United Kingdom predates the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 which, under s 6, places 
a direct obligation on the police ensure that all of their activities are compatible with 
Convention rights. In any event, the police use of AFR, even in public spaces, can be 
distinguished from the police collection and retention of photographs of the applicants in Wood 
and Murray, because AFR involves biometric data processing. This point was recognised by 
both the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal in Bridges.71 It is perhaps out of sensitivity to 
these developments in the legal and technological landscape that the police have tended in 
recent challenges to their use of overt surveillance to rely on positive powers to engage in 
various activities in the fulfilment of their basic common law duties, to justify the use of overt 
surveillance technologies.72  
                                                             
66 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1987] NI 219, as quoted in Murray v United Kingdom (1995) 19 EHRR 193 at 
[30].  
67 Murray v United Kingdom (1995) 19 EHRR 193 at [88].  
68 R (on the application of Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2010] 1 WLR 123. 
69 R (on the application of Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2010] 1 WLR 123 at [54]. 
70 See for example Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41; S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 
1581; MM v United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 1906.  
71 Bridges, above n 44, at [85]. 
72 See for example Metropolitan Police Service Live Facial Recognition: Legal Mandate (Version 1-01, 2020) 
para 2.2. Aston engages in detail with the seeming juridical tension between these two competing conceptions of 
the common law, and elucidates the difficulty in either of them providing an adequate legal basis for overt 
surveillance in the related context of overt police photography of public protests. See V Aston, ‘Conceptualising 
surveillance harms in the context of political protest: privacy, autonomy and freedom of assembly’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of East Anglia, 2019). 
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In Bridges, the Divisional Court rejected the claimant’s contention that the police could not 
rely on their common law powers to use AFR and, as such, the use of AFR was ultra vires the 
SWP. Haddon-Cave LJ and Swift J relied on the following passage from Rice v Connolly: 
[I]t is part of the obligations and duties of a police constable to take all steps which appear 
to him necessary for keeping the peace, for preventing crime or for protecting property from 
criminal damage. There is no exhaustive definition of the powers and obligations of the 
police, but they are at least those, and they would further include the duty to detect crime 
and to bring an offender to justice.73 
Drawing on Wood and the Supreme Court judgment in R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police 
Officer, the Divisional Court held that this general power of the police covers the use, retention, 
and disclosure of imagery of individuals for any of the duties articulated in Rice.74 In Catt, the 
applicant unsuccessfully argued that the retention by police of information about his attendance 
at several protests against the arms trade, which included written notes of his activities and a 
photograph, violated his Article 8 rights. Lord Sumption, in the majority, held that the power 
of the police to engage in surveillance of this kind lay not in the residual liberty of all citizens 
to do anything that is not forbidden, but rather in the general common law powers of the police 
officer to fulfil his basic duties: ‘At common law the police have the power to obtain and store 
information for policing purposes, ie broadly speaking for the maintenance of public order and 
the prevention and detection of crime.’75 
These powers, in Lord Sumption’s view, did not extend to cover what he described as 
‘intrusive’ methods of obtaining information, such as entry upon private property or acts of 
physical coercion, that are normally regulated by statute or other more narrowly prescribed 
sources. However, they were ‘amply sufficient’ to cover the obtaining and storage of 
photographs.76 On this basis, the Divisional Court in Bridges classified live AFR as ‘non-
intrusive’ and thus falling within the scope of the common law powers of the police. The 
Divisional Court ruled that the distinction turned on whether there was a physical intrusion 
with a person’s rights vis-à-vis his or her home or interference with his or her bodily integrity.77 
The Court of Appeal upheld this aspect of the Divisional Court’s ruling, citing Lord Sumption’s 
observations in Catt with approval. The issue for the Court of Appeal was not that there was 
no adequate domestic legal basis providing for the use of AFR, but rather that this basis did not 
meet the quality of law requirements to be ‘in accordance with the law’.78 It seems that only 
forms of ‘physical’ intrusion, such as DNA sampling and bugging private property, fall beyond 
the scope of the common law powers of the police, thus requiring a more narrowly prescribed 
legal basis. 
This is a significant finding, as it permits the police to use new overt surveillance technologies 
like AFR operationally, without Parliament authorising this use. It puts the police collection 
and processing of biometric data by AFR in a separate category to other forms of biometric 
surveillance, such as arrestee DNA and fingerprint collection and comparison. These tend to 
require ‘physical intrusion’ and, as such, have a statutory legal basis under the Protection of 
                                                             
73 Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414 at 419. 
74 R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers [2015] AC 1065 at para 7. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Bridges (Divisional Court), above n 23, at [74]. 
78 Bridges, above n 44, at [77], [91]. 
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Freedoms Act 2012. The effect of the Divisional Court’s interpretation of these cases is that 
statutes are only relevant in so far as they place limitations on how AFR is used by the police. 
Thus, the police are free to trial and use these new technologies in the absence of the democratic 
mandate that legislation passed by Parliament provides. If this is the case, there is no need for 
police AFR use to be approved by our elected representatives, usually following robust debate 
on the implications this use, and consideration of expert evidence scrutinised by Select 
Committees. The decision to use AFR is a matter for police to decide for themselves; their 
discretion on this matter is fettered only by the limits of their common law powers which, as 
the Court in Bridges acknowledged, are expressed in ‘very broad terms’.79 It is noteworthy that 
in Catt v United Kingdom, the ECtHR expressed concern that the collection and retention by 
police of personal information taken from public space in that case ‘did not have a clearer and 
more coherent legal base’ before concluding that the retention violated Article 8 ECHR.80  
That said, it is difficult to fault the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal’s interpretation of 
recent domestic authorities in Wood and Catt, which, as a matter of stare decisis, were binding 
on them in Bridges. These authorities do suggest that the general common law powers of the 
police set out in Rice extend to the collection, use, retention and dissemination of facial images. 
The problem is that, in interpreting the common law powers of the police so broadly, these 
authorities may have sent the law down a wrong path. 
There is clear domestic authority for Lord Sumption’s observation in Catt that physical acts 
which would otherwise constitute a technical assault or trespass fall far outside the scope of 
the common law powers of police.81 However, it does not necessarily follow that the powers 
conferred upon police by their common law duties extend to cover all acts that are not 
‘physically’ intrusive in the sense described in Bridges. For example, in Rice, the appellant 
successfully argued that the offence of obstruction of justice was not made out in circumstances 
where he merely refused to provide his name or other assistance to a police constable in the 
course of his investigation into a series of breaking offences. Lord Parker CJ held that police 
constables have a duty to take steps which appear necessary to prevent and detect crime. 
However, as Aston notes, this finding was ‘categorical’; the power of the constable did not 
extend to taking all steps he considered necessary for the prevention or detection of crime.82 
Indeed, Lord Parker CJ held that there are clear limits on the common law power (beyond those 
that interfere with the individual’s physical home or bodily integrity); one being that citizens 
are not under a general legal duty to assist the police by providing them with information, and 
police cannot rely on their common law powers to demand such assistance. This was the 
unambiguous ratio of Rice.  
We submit that other forms of non-physical coercion of citizens (such as verbally badgering or 
harassing an individual in the street) would also fall beyond the common law powers of the 
police, even if they involve no physical restriction of the individual’s movement. None of the 
judgments of senior courts prior to Bridges drew the boundary of the common law powers so 
bluntly. Historically, domestic courts have tended to focus on whether the conduct of a police 
                                                             
79 Bridges (Divisional Court), above n 23, at [73]. 
80 Catt v United Kingdom App no 43514/15 (ECHR, 24 January 2019) at [98]. 
81 See for example Davis v Lisle [1936] 2 KB 434; Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510; Walker v Commissioner 
of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWCA Civ 897.  
82 V Aston, ‘Conceptualising surveillance harms in the context of political protest: privacy, autonomy and freedom 
of assembly’ (PhD Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2019) 77.  
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officer constitutes a significant interference with the individual’s liberty or property generally, 
and not on the existence of physical contact. Thus, in the famous case of Collins v Wilcock, 
Goff LJ held  
A police officer has no power to require a man to answer him, though he has the advantage 
of authority, enhanced as it is by the uniform which the state provides and requires him to 
wear, in seeking a response to his inquiry. What is not permitted, however, is the unlawful 
use of force or the unlawful threat, actual or implicit, to use force.83 
Here, the Court recognises that, as well as physical intrusions, excessive demands to answer 
questions, including the use of actual or implicit threats fall outside of the common law powers. 
Indeed, some forms of physical touching will fall within the police common law powers, as in 
Donnelly v Jackman, where a police officer repeatedly tapped a man on the shoulder in order 
to get his attention for the purpose of making enquiries about an offence which the officer had 
cause to believe the defendant might have committed.84 Even though this case involved making 
physical contact with the defendant, the Court focused on the degree of intrusion into the 
person's liberty and not on whether the type of intrusion involved trespass onto his physical 
realm. As Talbot J stated, ‘it is not every trivial interference with a citizen's liberty that amounts 
to a course of conduct sufficient to take the officer out of the course of his duties.’85 
The focus in Donnelly, on the significance of the intrusion with the person’s liberty to use 
public space unmolested, seems better equipped for the information age than an arbitrary focus 
on whether the means used by police to obtain personal information occasioned physical 
contact. It is one thing to hold that the common law power to prevent crime and bring offenders 
to justice is good enough for the police to ask for identifying particulars of a person seen in the 
vicinity of reported criminality (even though the person may be under no legal obligation to 
comply with the request). It is quite another for this same power to support the use of myriad 
biometric and/or algorithmic technologies, which facilitate the use and collection of ever-more 
sensitive personal information by public authorities. AFR enmeshes physical and informational 
forms of surveillance by collecting information from the physical body of the person (albeit 
without occasioning physical contact) and breaking this down into an information structure, 
which can then be processed. The distinction for fleshing out the scope of the common law 
powers of the police, between physical and informational intrusions, does not seem to recognise 
that physical contact is a poor barometer for gauging the intrusiveness of a surveillance 
measure. The common law powers of the police enunciated in Rice have been extended too far. 
 
(a) Proportionality, Balancing and ‘Tick-Box’ Human Rights Protection 
One significant and unresolved issue with the English legal framework as it relates to AFR is 
that it leaves it largely to the police to decide whether the use of AFR (and thus further 
biometric technologies as they emerge) is ‘proportionate and necessary’, according to the 
precepts of the common law necessity test; Article 8(2); and the DPA and so on. The Appeal 
Court in Bridges considered the question of proportionality, and noted that, strictly speaking, 
                                                             
83 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 at 1178; See also R v Waterfield [1964] 1 QB 164 at 170 per Ashworth 
J. 
84 Donnelly v Jackman (1970) 1 WLR 562. 
85 Ibid, at 565. 
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it was unnecessary to do so.86 Regrettably, this assessment was formalistic, not internally 
consistent, and unduly brief.  
As indicated in the account of the case above, Mr Bridges submitted that the Divisional Court 
had erred when examining the ‘cost’ side of proportionality by taking into account the impact 
of AFR on him alone, and that ‘as a matter of common sense’ account should be taken of the 
interference with the Article 8 rights of all other members of the public present at the two 
deployments also.87 This contention was rejected by the Appeal Court, which held that the 
challenge was to a ‘very specific deployment of AFR Locate on two particular occasions’. To 
come to this conclusion, it drew on the precise terms of the Statement of Facts and Grounds 
that this Appellant’s Article 8 rights had been violated. It is regrettable that the ground on 
proportionality was not framed in more general terms.  Indeed, both the Court of Appeal and 
the Divisional Court themselves framed the appeal as a review of the legality of SWP’s 
‘ongoing’ trial of AFR. Moreover, one can question how the proportionality of future use could 
be assessed adequately through reference to the impact it has on Mr Bridges solely. We suggest 
a wider lens should have been adopted in terms of scrutinising proportionality, given the impact 
on other individuals in these deployments and beyond.  
The Court of Appeal differentiated Bridges from challenges to a ‘general measure, for example 
a policy or even a piece of legislation’, such as in Tigere where the Supreme Court considered 
eligibility for student loans for English residents.88 In such challenges to a ‘general measure’, 
it may be appropriate for the Court to assess the balance between the impact on every person 
who is affected by the measure and the interests of the community.89 That was not the 
interpretation in Bridges. The Court could have considered this use of AFR a ‘general 
measure’, affecting as it did anyone in particular public spaces in Cardiff during certain times. 
That said, States are afforded a wider margin of appreciation when it comes to measures of 
general economic or social strategy,90 so this would not affect the ultimate determination. Even 
without such an interpretation, the Court could have considered more fully the intrusion on 
every person subject to the deployment of the technology, as well as on the public en masse.  
As well as limiting the breadth of the impact, the level of the perceived intrusion was also 
downplayed by the Court. The effect on members of the public who were in an analogous 
situation to Bridges was ‘as negligible as the impact on the Appellant’s Article 8 rights’, and 
this impact of ‘very little weight cannot become weightier simply because other people were 
also affected’. The Court stated that this was not a question of simple multiplication, but rather 
an exercise of judgement.91 There is little elaboration of what this judgement entailed. 
Moreover, in terms of consistency, it is hard to reconcile this statement about negligible impact 
with the holding of the Divisional Court that Article 8 was engaged by AFR technology, the 
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comparison with fingerprints and DNA, and the description that AFR enables the extraction of 
unique information and identifiers of ‘an intrinsically private character’.92 The public visibility 
of a person’s face was not regarded as detracting from this, and Article 8 was engaged even 
though retention of the data was momentary. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal approved one 
of the grounds of appeal which stated that the DPIA had proceeded incorrectly on the basis that 
Article 8 was not engaged nor ‘more accurately was not infringed’.93  
It is difficult to see how Article 8 could be infringed just negligibly by AFR. That said, this is 
a common approach of domestic courts in surveillance cases, whereby the interference is 
characterised as minor or of negligible impact, before the benefits are trumpeted.94 Courts seem 
to overlook the reality of overt and biometric surveillance as a preventive policing strategy 
geared towards the effective management of populations, and instead focus on individual (and 
physically intrusive) liberty restriction. This is a partial and questionable approach. This 
approach also seems out of step with ECtHR jurisprudence, which has consistently held that 
the recording and processing of an individual’s photographic data is protected by Article 8. In 
Reklos v Greece, the ECtHR held 
A person’s image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals 
the person’s unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The 
right to the protection of one’s image is thus one of the essential components of personal 
development and presupposes the right to control the use of that image.95 
The ECtHR has held that where a record of an individual’s image is generated from CCTV 
cameras monitoring publicly accessible space, and retained by a public authority,96 this can 
engage Article 8. AFR surveillance goes further than merely collecting and storing 
photographic images through CCTV surveillance as it involves the biometric processing of the 
facial geometry of those scanned. This enables public authorities to subject those who traverse 
public space to an automated identification process in real-time, without their knowledge or 
consent. Thus, AFR surveillance enables the police to go further in transgressing social norms 
governing the flow of information about individuals as they occupy public space than CCTV 
surveillance or other forms of overt photography.97 
The concept of proportionality is embedded in human rights jurisprudence and discourse, 
though it is not uncontroversial.98 In this specific instance, the analysis in Bridges on 
proportionality overall was perfunctory, and did not really come close to grappling with the 
politically contentious issues at the heart of the debate on AFR, and its wider social effects, 
beyond the impact on the individual claimant. It might well be argued that a court is not best 
placed to engage in this sort of in-depth normative analysis, which is a fair remark. But, as 
Parliament has declined to regulate AFR in any meaningful way, and indeed is not required to 
do so, the decision of when and where AFR is proportionate is left largely in the hands of the 
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police, who are institutionally ill-suited to striking a fair balance between crime control and 
human rights impacts. Although process-based judicial review aims to harness the legislature 
and police to broader HR principles, this is inadequate because it entails a post hoc 
consideration where the role of the court is to engage in a limited review of AFR surveillance, 
grounded in broad common law compliance and a brief necessity analysis, and not to draft 
legislation on the appropriate limits of AFR.  
Moreover, the full spectrum of harms cannot be captured through orthodox legal analytical 
lenses regarding human rights and data protection, which are focused on the impact on 
individual rights against state/data controller. The impact of the police use of AFR is greater 
than the impact it has on any one individual subject to AFR processing. It shifts the balance of 
power between state, who are using the products of private companies, and the public in favour 
of the former. In essence, law is not enough.  
 
(b) Some comparative insights  
 
Other jurisdictions, like Scotland and New Zealand, are proceeding with more caution in this 
context, in contrast to England and Wales, Australia and the US.99  
 
In New Zealand, some human rights protections applicable to AFR surveillance are less 
entrenched in the domestic legal framework than in England and Wales.100 For example, 
individuals cannot use domestic human rights legislation to advance a judicial review of the 
effect of a piece of legislation or policy affecting their rights. Moreover, New Zealand’s 
Privacy Act 2020 does not offer the same level of protection for the collection and processing 
of AFR data as the European’s Union General Data Processing Regulation (GDPR). The 
Privacy Act 2020 offers a single level of protection for all personal information without 
distinguishing AFR as involving the processing of sensitive biometric data, and does not 
require that the use of AFR must be ‘strictly necessary and subject to appropriate safeguards 
for the rights and freedoms of the data subject’.101  
 
Despite sharing a broad alignment with England and Wales in terms of legal structure - 
particularly as far as the applicability of human rights and data protection provisions to the 
police use of AFR is concerned - Scotland has imposed a moratorium on live AFR. While 
Police Scotland’s 10-year strategy, Policing 2026, included a proposal to introduce AFR,102 a 
Scottish parliamentary committee was highly critical of this plan. The Justice Sub-Committee 
on Policing found that the proposed live facial recognition software is known to discriminate 
against women and those from black, Asian and ethnic minority communities; that there is no 
justifiable basis for Police Scotland to invest in this technology; that prior to any decision to 
introduce it a robust and transparent assessment of its necessity and accuracy should be 
undertaken; that its potential impacts on people and communities should be understood, and 
overall that AFR would be a radical departure from the fundamental principle of policing by 
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consent.103 A subsequent response from Police Scotland indicated that, much like in New 
Zealand, the police were not using live facial recognition technology currently, and had no 
plans to do so. Police Scotland was also clear that it would ensure safeguards are in place prior 
to introducing AFR, and agreed that the impact of its use should be fully understood before it 
is introduced.104  
 
The experiences of New Zealand and Scotland serve to show that in England and Wales 
pervasive AFR surveillance is the product of both structural legal weakness and cultural 
permissiveness of surveillance. We endorse the approach of the Scottish Government that has 
emphasised the need for assessment of human rights impact prior to the introduction of any 
technology, not afterwards as occurred in England and Wales. Moreover, the parliamentary 
report’s foregrounding of communities and consent to policing is key.  
 
Such contrasting dynamics in terms of policing and politics within Great Britain are not unique. 
The situation in England and Wales can be seen to follow a pattern that emerged in respect of 
police use of DNA material, another form of biometrics, where likewise the onus was on the 
individual to challenge expansive laws and practices after the event. In contrast to AFR, 
however, the police were not pushing the boundaries of what was permitted in respect of DNA, 
or operating under any legal uncertainty, but rather were complying with the terms of what was 
deemed ultimately to be problematic legislation, in terms of human rights. So rather than a 
legal lacuna as regarding AFR, the law on DNA collection and retention was remarkably 
permissive.  
In S and Marper v United Kingdom,105 the ECtHR considered an Article 8(2)  challenge to laws 
in England and Wales which permitted a non-intimate sample106 like a mouth swab to be taken 
without consent from a person who had been charged with, informed that they would be 
reported for, or convicted of a recordable offence.107 Such DNA samples were kept indefinitely, 
regardless of the outcome of the investigation or subsequent criminal trial, due to their 
perceived value in crime control.108 Two people, S (a child who was acquitted) and Marper (an 
adult against whom proceedings were not initiated),
  
sought judicial review of the police 
decision to collect and retain DNA from them, based on the existing legal framework. Their 
claim was unsuccessful in the High Court, whose decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal, 
on the basis that the risks to the individual were not great and were outweighed by the benefits 
of retention. Similarly, the House of Lords dismissed their appeal, finding that there was no 
breach of Article 8 and that if such a breach had occurred it constituted just minor interference, 
and that retention was proportionate to its aims.109 (This is akin to the Court of Appeal in 
Bridges.) In contrast, the Grand Chamber in Strasbourg held that such ‘blanket and 
indiscriminate’ retention of DNA violated Article 8.110 Unlike in Bridges, the issue there was 
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retention rather than collection and processing per se. Notably for present purposes, the 
European Court endorsed the Scottish approach, whereby non-conviction-based DNA retention 
occurred for serious suspected offences for a certain timeframe only.111 DNA could be 
collected in Scotland from someone arrested and detained on suspicion of having committed 
an offence punishable by imprisonment, and such samples and information derived from them 
would be destroyed following a decision not to institute criminal proceedings or when 
proceedings did not end with conviction.112 DNA retention was allowed after prosecutions 
which did not lead to conviction for certain sexual or violent offences only.113 
 
In Bridges, the Court of Appeal claimed that ‘the context of [S and Marper] is far removed 
from [Bridges]’114. While the context of the case itself might differ in respect of the particular 
sort of interference, the legislative and preceding context is comparable.  So the more cautious 
approach of Scotland has been evidenced previously. While one could regard this as 
exemplifying the luxury of a smaller jurisdiction, with fewer issues of crime, this is not 
sustainable. Rather this embodies the impact of a more interventionist and rights-oriented 
Parliamentary culture, and less of a law and order discourse. The state of affairs in England 
and Wales demonstrates an abdication of responsibility by Westminster Government to 
legislate in this context, the reticence of the courts in respect of the public framing of 
surveillance, and the enduring agenda and institutional bias of police forces.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the police enjoy a broad discretion in using automated facial recognition, as a 
consequence of the overlapping, implicit framework within which they operate. We argue that 
AFR should not be used in the absence of explicit authorisation by Parliament with full 
legislative process, and there needs to be ethical review prior to policing roll out.115 This article 
has identified a series of issues of law and political culture that have led to expansive 
deployments of AFR in England and Wales, without due regard for its varied human rights 
impacts. We do not seek to resolve the appropriate content of legislation specifically. But, when 
thinking of possible future regulation, we might draw on the way covert surveillance is 
regulated.116 In brief, this could entail legal procedures at the national level as well as the local. 
In terms of the former, a national statutory basis for AFR and other police algorithmic use could 
provide democratic mandate, and an accompanying statutory code of practice or subordinate 
legislation for each type of algorithmic surveillance may provide specific rules, such as limits 
to specific targeted persons and locations; retention limits; and requirements that guide the 
necessity analysis undertaken by particular forces. At the local level, independent 
verification/authentication of the AFR or other algorithmic systems used could uncover and 
address potential accuracy and discrimination issues, with perhaps the development of an 
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approved list of providers. Requirements for the independent approval and oversight of the 
proportionality and necessity of operation in accordance with the Code of Practice can also be 
incorporated into the statutory framework as appropriate, and could take the form of judicial 
authorisation, as in relation to search warrants. 
The Divisional Court in Bridges opened its judgment with an astute observation: ‘The 
algorithms of the law must keep pace with new and emerging technologies.’117 Beyond enticing 
the reader in, the line captures the significance of the challenge that faces lawmakers as new 
technologies increase the capacity of law enforcement agencies to subject citizens to scrutiny 
and control. Much like a good algorithm, English law should provide a clear process; a process 
for determining the limits of the police’s uptake of new technology that is compatible with the 
rule of law and our existing international human rights obligations. In particular, with each new 
innovation in surveillance technology, English law should stipulate clearly whether or not it is 
permissible for police to deploy the technology and provide guidance on the circumstances in 
which it is appropriate to use the technology before it is operationalised. Though few technical 
innovations can be envisaged or predicted and so legislated for in advance, what can be done 
is the appropriate defining and controlling of police powers. As far as AFR is concerned, the 
‘algorithms’ of English law suffer from numerous structural deficiencies and have failed to rise 
to the challenge of providing adequate regulation for expansive police surveillance. 
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